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This paper explores competitiveness of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
economy over a long period of 1960-2003 and its link 
with cocoa prices.  The main conclusions are as follows. 
   First, using four measures of real effective exchange 
rate (REER) for the   1960-2002 period, we track the 
evolution of REER and conclude, inter alia, that until 
2003, REER remained well below its 1994 level.
   Second, we find that based on our measure of the 
multilateral REER with dynamic weights, which covers 
most recorded trade, France no longer dominates Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade. Instead, Cote d’Ivoire has diversified 
its set of trading partners. Unfortunately, it has also 
specialized in one export product, raw cocoa. This paper 
aims to contribute to the question to what extent do 
This paper— a product of the Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Unit 4 (AFTP4), Africa Poverty Reduction 
& Economic Management (PREM) Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the sources 
and constraints of long-term economic growth in African countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on 
the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at zbogetic@worldbank.org. 
cocoa prices affect Cote d’Ivoire’s competitiveness in 
world trade?
   Third, the answer to this question is that cocoa 
prices are an important determinant of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
competitiveness. Similar to the case of a classic “Dutch 
Disease,” increases in the real world price of a “natural 
resource” (i.e., cocoa) tend to result in the appreciation of 
the CFA franc and a loss in competitiveness. Econometric 
tests further confirm that 1994 was a “break-point” not 
only for growth and productivity (as documented in the 
two related papers) but also for trade competitiveness. 
Recent productivity per worker trends versus wages also 
seem to indicate slow growth in 1996-2000, without 
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This paper explores empirically the evolution of competitiveness of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
economy over a long period of 1960-2003 and the link between competitiveness and the 
key macroeconomic variable––cocoa prices.   
 
The organization of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we define, present, and 
review four “Edwards” measures of the bilateral and multilateral real exchange rate, one 
set computed with CPIs, and another with GDP deflators (which we adopt). These 
descriptive statistics support the commonly-held views that the Cote d’Ivoire CFA was 
over-valued prior to the 1994 devaluation; and that the devaluation was big enough to 
“make a difference” in improving competitiveness and triggering the desired economic 
recovery.   
 
Section 3, starts with a time series of the percentage of total recorded trade “covered” or 
included in our MREER indices built with trade-weights for twelve representative major 
trade partners. We review the evolution of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade partners over time, which 
have changed slowly but profoundly between 1960 and 2000. Many small-volume links 
have eroded the once-large shares of traditional trade partners, especially France. Over 
the years, Cote d’Ivoire has acquired many new trade partners, some in Africa, and some 
with emerging non-African non-EEC countries. 
 
In Section 4, we provide evidence that Cote d’Ivoire has concentrated in cocoa 
production and specialized in raw cocoa exports, rather than diversifying the goods it 
exports.  While the country now has many customers around the world, it is mainly 
selling them raw agricultural commodities, especially cocoa.  
 
In Section 5, we test the extent to which cocoa prices impact Cote d’Ivoire’s real 
exchange rate. As OLS estimates would be inefficient, inconsistent, and possibly biased 
in these circumstances, we use fully modified least squares approach, which is robust in 
the face of endogeneity, serial correlation, and breaks in the data generation process. The 
results provide evidence that the Cote d’Ivoire CFA is a “commodity currency” in the 
sense that cocoa prices impact the real exchange rate in a manner consistent with “Dutch 
Disease”. 
 
Section 6, presents recent data on productivity and wage trends by sector. We also 
provide a tentative measure of unit labor costs, a supplemental measure of 
competitiveness, for 1996-2000. The data seems to reinforce the notion that the beneficial 
effects of the 1994 devaluation had worn off by the late 1990s. Section 7, contains 
concluding remarks. 
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2.   Indices of the Real Exchange Rate 
 
First we present definitions of indices measuring the real exchange rate. Then we present 
four indices, and compare them to each other. 
 
Defining the Real Exchange Rate 
 
We relied upon Sebastian Edward’s definitions
1 of the real effective exchange rate 
(REER). The concept requires a trade partner. So, we have bilateral rates (BREER) 
between two specific trading partners, and the multilateral real effective exchange rate 
(MREER), which includes a representative set of trade partners.   
 
Starting with a “purchasing power parity” (PPP) measure of the real exchange rate, built 
using consumer price indices (CPI), for the bilateral real effective exchange rate in time 
period t we have: 
 
(1) BREERt = (Et x CPIt
f)/CPIt
d   
 
Where Et is the number of CFA or local currency units per unit of foreign currency, the 
foreign CPI appears in the numerator, and the CPI for Cote d’Ivoire (the local economy) 
appears in the denominator.  
 
The multilateral REER is a weighted average of bilateral rates.  It is built using trade 
weights, αit, which sum to unity in time period t, obtained by in our case from IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics. In time period t, for i = 1 to n “representative” trading 
partners, we have: 






Edward’s formulation of the REER and the MREER differs from that commonly used by 
the International Monetary Fund, and we apologize for any confusion.  The IMF measure 
is essentially the inverse of the measure used here.  Also, the IMF uses geometric rather 
than arithmetic weighting when calculating the MREER.  
 
Indices Of The Real Exchange Rate 
 
We looked at the bilateral real exchange rate between the Cote d’Ivoire and France. 
France is the former ruling colonial power and was historically Cote d’Ivoire’s largest 
trading partner; the CFA franc was pegged to the French Franc. For the multilateral real 
effective exchange rate, we selected twelve of the largest trading partners in recent years, 
ensuring that we had eight of the top import origins and eight of the top export 
destinations across a span of recent years. Rather than using a single year upon which to 
                                                 
1 See Edwards 1988. 
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base our weights, we calculated dynamic weights which change over time as the 
proportion of trade with each partner within the representative set changes over time. 
 
We built our BREER and MREER  measures to be normalized at 1999 = 100 for all 
REER indices. That is the year following the CFA devaluation, when the CFA was 
thought by many to be more “fairly valued” that it had been for many years previously.  
And, 1995 is a common base year.
2 
 
Figure 1: Indices of Cote d’Ivoire’s Bilateral and Multilateral Real  Exchange Rate, Based on 
Consumer Price Indices 
Bilateral Versus Multilateral Real Exchange Rate in Cote d'Ivoire
Computed Using Consumer Price Indices























































































































The 1994 CFA devaluation improved competitiveness as measured by the REER. 
Figure 1 presents our measures of the bilateral and multilateral REER indices based upon  
consumer price indices. Given the use of the Edwards, rather than the IMF definition, a 
high index number represents many CFA francs per unit of foreign currency, indicating 
relative competitiveness. The two measures tend to move together, although in the mid 
1980s they diverge. Both measures moved upward by 40 index points in 1993-1994, at 
the time of the CFA devaluation. By our measure, the CFA may have been less over-
valued against its other trading partners in the years leading up to devaluation than it was 
against the French Franc.
3  Since the devaluation, the CPI BREER has declined by 
twenty index points, while the CPI MREER has not declined much at all. 
                                                 
2 These are relative and not absolute measures of competitiveness. They track relative competitiveness over 
time, but not across different sets of trade partners 
3 In part, this depends upon how the two measurements were aligned in 1995, the base year for both. We do 
not believe that any statements can be made on “relative competitiveness” using these indices. 
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Figure 2: Cote d’Ivoire’s Bilateral and Multilateral Real Exchange Rate,  Based on GDP Deflators 
Cote d'Ivoire: Multilateral Versus Bilateratal (France) 
Real Exchange Rate


































Years   -  Computed With Average Annual Data
Multi RER-GDP Defl - 12 Countries
Bi RER-GDP Defl - France
 
The CFA was overvalued prior to 1994.  Figure 2 depicts our indices of the REER 
constructed with GDP deflators. In this case, the apparent over-valuation of the CFA 
prior to devaluation is more pronounced than with the CPI REER measures  Both the 
bilateral and the multilateral measures have trended down in recent years since 1996, 
signaling a loss of some of the competitiveness gained in the 1994 devaluation. 
 
The preferred measure is the MREER built from GDP deflators
4. The CPI includes 
only final household consumer goods, while the GDP deflator includes all goods 
produced in the economy
5. The CPI and GDP deflator measures exhibit similar profiles
6.   
As the GDP-deflator based measure includes wholesale goods, raw commodities, and 
industrial inputs, it would seem to be the preferable measure to use, especially in the case 
of a commodity exporter.  As the multilateral real exchange rate index more closely 
approximates “the world”, the MREER seems much preferable to the BREER. 
 
                                                 
4 Ideally, we would like to have a measure of trade-able goods versus non-trade-able goods.  Some authors 
advocate using the foreign wholesale price indices (WPI) versus the domestic CPI.  We were unable to 
access a full set of WPIs for 1960-2002 for all countries in the MREER index to build this measure. 
5 Raw cocoa thus appears in the GDP deflator for Cote d’Ivoire; it dooes not appear in CPIs as it is not a 
final consumption product. 
6 We present comparisons of the CPI versus GDP-deflator indices in the Annex.  
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3.   Trade Partners and “MREER Coverage”   
 
Measuring the Completeness of MREER Indices 
 
For a country with many trade partners, it can be awkward and difficult to compute an 
MREER index that includes all partners.  However many partners it includes, it will 
remain a representative index.  And, some trade will not enter into the official statistics. 
MREER indices are approximations, so it is interesting to evaluate how complete the 
MREER index is. At the same time, we can address the evolution of trade patterns. 
 
Our MREER measure covers most of Cote d’Ivoire’s official trade. Figure 3 shows 
the percentage of official imports, exports, and total trade of Cote d’Ivoire is conducted 
with the twelve partners in the representative set.  While the percentage has declined over 
the period, it has usually included 70% or more of all trade and always more than 60%. 
 
Figure 3: “Coverage” of MREER Indices – Percent of Cote d’Ivoire’s Imports, Exports and Trade 
with the Twelve Countries Used in the Measure of the Multilateral Real Exchange Rate 
Cote d'Ivoire: "Coverage" of the Twelve-Country Measures of the 














































































































































Refer to the “pie charts” in the Annex ( Figure 14, Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17 ), 
which portray the distribution of trade among the twelve partners of the MREER index 
(plus “other” not in the index) in 1960, versus 2000 (the last “normal” year before 
conflict broke out).  Next, we look at the distribution of trade by partners over time. 
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Evolving Trade Patterns Over Time 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Traditional Major Export Destinations Over Time 
Cote D'Ivoire Trade: Percentage of Total Exports 















































































Figure 5: Distribution of Imports From Traditional Trade Partners Over Time 
Cote d'Ivoire Trade - Distribution of Imports
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France and Europe no longer dominate Cote d’Ivoire’s trade as they once did.  In 
1960, France took 52% of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and supplied 69% of imports. By 2000, 
France took 14% of exports and supplied 18% of imports.  In 2000, France had been 
displace by Nigeria as top import trade partner. Nigeria supplied 25% of Cote d’Ivoire’s 
imports in 2000, primarily petroleum.  Refer to Figure 4 and Figure 5. In 1960 the 
European Community (nearly all France) accounted for 70 % of Cote d’Ivoire’s imports 
and over 80% of exports. Even though the EEC is now much larger, in 2000 it accounted 
for only about half of trade. In 1960, almost all “EEC” trade was with France, but by 
2000 most EEC trade was not with France. 
 
Cote d’Ivoire developed a variety of smaller trade flows with new partners. 
“Others”, outside the top twelve used in our MREER measure, supplied only 15% of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s imports and took only 17% of its exports in 1960.  By 2000, “others” had 
become the “largest trading partner” and accounted for 38% of imports and 43% of 
exports. A number of African countries are now in the “top twelve”, but did not trade 
with Cote d’Ivoire in 1960.   
 
Non-traditional trade links have grown with non-African emerging economies, 
which as a group are now significant. Refer to Figure 6 and Figure 7. Exports to 
Mainland China, Hong Kong Russia, India, Brazil, Korea and Taiwan (as a group) have 
grown from nearly zero in 1960 to nearly 12% of total exports in 2000, while imports 
have grown from one percent in 1960 to as much as 9% in 1994 and then 1998.  The 
trade volume with these new trade partners fluctuates a great deal from year to year, and 
are less stable than volume with the traditional trade partners.  
 
Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade links are expanding and diversifying.  Numerous new 
customers buy Cote d’Ivoire’s products, and numerous new suppliers provide her 
imports. The old picture of Cote d’Ivoire as linked by trade almost exclusively to France 
is much less true than it used to be. 
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Figure 6: New Non-Traditional Non-African Non-EEC Export Destinations 



















































































































































Figure 7: New Non-Traditional Non-African Non-EEC Import Sources 
Cote d'Ivoire Trade: Imports from New 
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9 
4.   Raw Cocoa Dominates Cote d’Ivoire’s Trade 
 
While Cote d’Ivoire’s trade links have diversified, its export products have not. In 
the last section, we showed that over the last forty years Cote d’Ivoire has greatly 
expanded the list of countries that it trades with, and reduced its dependency upon the 
traditional trade partner, France. Here in this section we re-iterate some of the evidence 
that the reverse is true so far as the list of export products is concerned. 
 
In fact, Cote d’Ivoire has become heavily specialized in cocoa. Figure 9 (next page) 
shows four graphs which document this claim. Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa production grew to 
over 1.4 million metric tons in 2000; it is the world’s leading producer. The real price of 
raw cocoa grew from the early years to a peak in 1976 and then declined; at the same 
time Cote d’Ivoire’s output per worker followed the same boom-and-bust profile. Cocoa 
prices are volatile. Over the years, Cote d’Ivoire has devoted an ever-increasing amount 
of land to cocoa output. Cote d’Ivoire’s share of world output grew from less than 7% in 
1960 to over 41% in 2000. 
 
Raw cocoa now dominates the Ivorian economy and exports, even more than in the 
past.  Figure 8 below shows data which supports this claim. By 2000, raw cocoa was 
80% of the country’s commodity exports, over 50% of all exported goods and services, 
and 21% of the entire GDP.  When one considers that a great deal of output and 
economic activity in other sectors is cocoa-related, it is clear that this country has become 
quite dependent upon one raw commodity, cocoa.
7 
Figure 8: Cocoa Exports as a Percentage of Commodity Exports, All Exports (Including Services), 
and Gross Domestic Product 
Cote d'Ivoire: Cocoa Exports as a Percent of Basic Commodity Exports, of 
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7 Cote d’Ivoire’s number two export is coffee; coffee and cocoa prices correlate highly on world markets. 
Number three is cotton, another raw agricultural commodity.  They offer little in the way of benefits of 
diversification from cocoa. COTE D’IVOIRE: Competitiveness, Cocoa, and Real Exchange Rates 
Figure 9: World & Cote d’Ivoire Cocoa Production, World Prices,  Cocoa Land Use in Cote’ d’Ivoire, and Share of World Market 
Physical Cocoa Bean Production
 In the World and Cote d'Ivoire




















































COTE D'IVOIRE  
WORLD 
International Cocoa Prices 1960-2003: Estimated Spot Price, 
& Price Adusted by US Consumer Price Index (Base 1995)
 Based on near term futures prices converted to spot equivalents, 
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Cocoa as % of Arable and Permanent Crop Land
Cocoa Land as % Permanent Crop Land
 
Cote d'Ivoire Share of World Cocoa Bean Output
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5.  Do Cocoa Prices Move the Real Exchange Rate? 
 
REER, Commodity prices & Measuring Competitiveness. 
 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) is a fundamental competitiveness variable 
in small open economies and this is true for Cote d’Ivoire.  Real effective exchange 
rate equilibrates international trade and payments by closing excess demand or supply. In 
the case of a specialized commodity-producing country like Cote d’Ivoire, increases in 
the (real) world price of its export good, namely cocoa, tend to cause a real appreciation 
of the CFA franc. Vice versa, cocoa price declines would tend to cause real depreciation. 
However, if other domestic prices are rigid or adjust slowly, and if the exchange rate is 
also fixed, the real exchange rate may not adjust rapidly or completely. Does the 
mechanism work in Cote d’Ivoire? 
 
There are many challenges in measuring competitiveness. According to Harberger 
8the common conceptual measure of REER using the ratio of tradable-to-non tradable 
prices may not be appropriate if commodity prices are subject to shocks and represent a 
large share of a given economy. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire we would expect that a large 
inflow of foreign exchange earnings due to a high price of cocoa would induce a real 
appreciation of the FCFA. If we were to use a perfect measure of the prices of tradable 
goods (PT) and the prices of non-tradable goods (PNT
9), a very high weight of price of 
cocoa on PT would end up causing an increase in PT and thus an indication of a real 
depreciation, which would be nonsensical and makes this measure ambiguous. On the 
other hand, some authors
10 argue that in an economy with perfectly flexible prices and 
equalized wages across sectors, a real appreciation of the REER will ensue if there is a 
rise in the world price of the main exportable (here cocoa), caused by the increase in the 
relative price of the non traded good. It is precisely this vagueness about the dynamics 
that casts doubts on the appropriateness of usual REER measure for competitiveness. 
 
As Cashin et al (2002) point out, the usual determinants of REER that apply to 
many developed and developing countries may not apply to commodity-exporting 
countries like Cote d’Ivoire. Price rigidities, limited capital mobility and slow 
productivity improvements impede the activation of common channels of REER 
adjustments, namely real interest rate differentials and balance of payment effects.  
 
We find evidence of Dutch Disease-like syndrome. We test this fundamental 
relationship. We assume that the main source of real disturbances of the REER for Cote 
d’Ivoire is the world price of cocoa, and go on to test if there exist a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between Cote d’Ivoire’s REER and real world cocoa prices. The resulting 
estimates allow us to assess the order of magnitude of an external shock stemming from 
cocoa prices and how it impacts Cote d’Ivoire’s competitiveness. The results strongly 
                                                 
8 2004. 
9 Perfect in the sense that these to prices represent undistorted goods, i.e. they assume away all trade 
restrictions that may in fact be in place. 
10 See Reinhart and Rogogff (2001) and Cashin (2002). 
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suggest a case of “Dutch Disease.” The evidence is that. positive shock to cocoa prices 
generate a real appreciation of the CFA Franc in Cote d’Ivoire (and, negative shocks 
cause real depreciation). 
 
Testing REER Fundamentals in Cote d’Ivoire 
 
We seek to test the hypothesis that the fundamental determinant of competitiveness 
for Cote d’Ivoire is cocoa prices. The measure of competitiveness that we use is the 
multilateral REER, and a main determinant is the real international price of cocoa
11. 
 
Two testable hypotheses characterize Cote d’Ivoire’s ‘fundamentals’ in the determination 
and behavior of its real exchange rate. 
  
•  First, cocoa prices are prime determinants of the REER. Cocoa prices seem to be 
the major determinant of real adjustments in the trade sector due to the increased 
specialization of Cote d’Ivoire in cocoa production, especially since the late 
1970’s, increasing the country’s exposure to external shocks from cocoa prices. 
 
•  Second, a break-point has occurred in the REER process. Cote d’Ivoire has 
attempted several structural reforms over the years, as well as a major devaluation 
in the nominal peg of its exchange rate. These policy shifts coupled with highly 
volatile terms of trade, lead us to presume that in the period 1960-2002 there has 
been a major shift in the competitiveness front for Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
Testing the first hypothesis involves a parameter estimate. As for the second, we let the 
data tell us the timing of such break, if any, through estimating the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the MREER and cocoa prices with an econometric procedure that 
allows for a structural level-shift of unknown timing.  
 
Econometric Strategy and Results 
 
The econometric strategy we implemented was as follows
12: We first proceeded to test if 
the cocoa prices and MRER time series are integrated processes of order one, I(1), 
through Augmented-Dickey Fuller Tests and Phillips-Perron Tests. Our results indicate 
the both time series are I(1) [See test values in the Appendix]. 
 
We then assessed if cocoa prices (Granger-) cause the MRER. The test revealed that 
indeed MRER is Granger-caused by cocoa prices so we pose the cointegrating relation to 
be: 
                                                 
11 Cashin (2002) uses the monthly REER published by the IMF and an index of real (1980-2000) 
commodity prices as the main explanatory regressor. We instead use annual MRER and cocoa prices from 
1960 to 2002 (yearly). Even though we have fewer observations, our data spans a longer time period, and 
thus may be able to pick up richer episodes of economic variability. 
12 See Hansen and Philips (1990), Hansen (1996) and Cashin et al (2002) for a detailed explanation and 
application of these methods. The first two references are econometric, while the later is an application of 
the method to commodity prices and real exchange rates. 
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T t CPRICE MRER t t t ,...., 1                         ln ln = + + = ε β α   
We then test for the stationarity of the residual (Engle-Granger Test), which turned out to 
be I(0) so that the equation above is indeed a cointegrating relation.  
 
Cocoa prices move Cote d’Ivoire’s real exchange rate, and are a source of volatility.  
Refer to the FMLS model results reported in Table 1.  The real world price of cocoa is 
negatively associated with Cote d’Ivoire’s real exchange rate. The parameter point 
estimate for β is of the correct sign, plausible in magnitude, and statistically significant. 
The evidence here supports the assertion that the Cote d’Ivoire CFA is indeed a “cocoa 
currency” in Cashin’s sense. One single commodity price is an important factor in the 
country’s competitive equilibrium, a consequence of cocoa specialization. By this best 
estimate, a one percent increase in cocoa prices results in eleven-one-hundredths of one 
percent (0.108) appreciation in Cote d’Ivoire’s multi-lateral real effective exchange 
rate.
13 This evidence supports the assertion that world cocoa prices are a source of 
volatility to the competitive equilibrium of the economy of Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
Even though we expect that the competitiveness of Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a major 
structural change, we are unwilling here to assert the timing of such event. We resorted to 
the Hansen-Phillips (1996) test for structural break in the presence of I(1) processes. In 
other words, we applied a test of parameter stability once we had established that there is 
at least one long-run equilibrium relationship between cocoa prices and MREER in Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
 








= + + + =
b     t   if   0
b      t if   1
,...., 1                         ln ln
it
t it t t N t CPRICE MRER
ϕ
ε ϕ β α
 
where lnMRER is the (log of) the multilateral real exchange rate, lnCprice is the log of 
the real price of cocoa and ϕ is a dummy variable constructed for every candidate break 
year (b). We then ran an exhaustive block of equations with level dummies in the year, 
one for each ‘candidate’ breakpoint. We then computed the ADF statistics for each of the 
residual series (in our case, 42 regressions) and chose our statistic as the largest negative 
number of these (i.e. ADF*=min{ ADF1,…., ADF43}) where we test the null of no level 
shift in the cointegrating vector of prices. 
 
The statistical evidence: 1994 was a break-point for international competitiveness. 
This unsurprising and plausible result came from the data alone, and does not arise from a 
prior hypothesis. Hansen and Phillips (1996) present the asymptotic critical values for the 
ADF* statistic as defined above for our level-shift model. The data strongly suggests that 
                                                 
13 Whether this rate of adjustment is rapid enough or large enough is yet another question, not addressed 
here. 
13 COTE D’IVOIRE: Competitiveness, Cocoa, and Real Exchange Rates 
there is a structural break in the competitiveness variable in the year 1994
14, the year of 
the devaluation of the FCFA.  
 
The devaluation was big enough to make a difference on the competitiveness front. 
The policy was sizable enough to make a structural shift in the competitiveness long-run 
equilibrium relationship with cocoa prices
15. The MREER shifted upwards (towards 




After identifying where the structural break is and according to Hansen and Phillips 
(1996), the appropriate estimation procedure for the cointegrating parameter, i.e. the 
marginal impact of a change in cocoa prices on the MRER, should be a fully-modified 
OLS method. See Table 1. The FMOLS estimation, proposed by Phillips and Hansen 
(1990) and Hansen and Phillips (1990), was designed to estimate cointegrating 
relationships, modifying the traditional OLS by allowing us to correct simultaneously for 
the effect of the serial correlation in the error term and the endogeneity of the 
regressors
17.  
Table 1: Cocoa Prices and the Real Exchange Rate - Fully Modified Least Squares Regression 
Parameter Estimates and Goodness-of-Fit Measures. 
FMOLS Estimates: 
Cote d’Ivoire’s Multilateral Real Exchange Rate 
As Impacted by Real World Cocoa Prices 
Structural Break in the MREER series according to Hansen-Phillips Test: 1994. 
       PARAMETER ESTIMATES   
Constant: 4.963449  
LnCocoaPrices: -0.108601  
Dummy (zero after 1994): -0.278431  
Dependent Variable: lnMREER 
STATISTIC OF THE JOINT SIGNIFICANCE TEST for ALL VARIABLES: 
40.313583       p-value: 0.000000  
STATISTIC OF THE INDIVIDUAL SIGNIFICANCE:  
Regressor: Constant Statistic: 1135.883200 p-value: 0.000000  
Regressor: LnCocoaPrices Statistic: 4.417987 p-value: 0.035562  
Regressor: Dummy Statistic: 13.968075 p-value: 0.000186  
 
 
                                                 
14 The Z* value that we computed is –4.1 and the asymptotic critical value at 10% is –4.3 and –2.5 for 15%. 
We think that as our sample becomes more informative (i.e. increases in size), the significance will 
improve. 
15 Cocoa production and exports increased after the devaluation. 
16 That is, the coefficient estimate on the 1960-1994 dummy is negative in sign. 
17 The serial autocorrelation gives rise to inefficiency (i.e. very wide confidence intervals) and the 
endogeneity causes inconsistency in the OLS estimators. 
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6.   Wages, Growth and Employment 
 
In 1996-2000, nominal value added grew only slightly faster than the wage bill or 
work force. Table 2 reports statistics
18 on employment, the nominal wage bill, nominal 
value added (total and per worker) and a rough estimate on unit labor cost for major 
sectors, with compound average annual growth rates to measure trends, for 1996-2000. 
Nominal value added grew very slightly faster than either the wage bill or work force.  
However, value added per worker grew more slowly than inflation, signaling continued 
declines in real output per worker. The rough estimate of unit labor costs is 
approximately flat for the period
19. According to these figures, the traditional pattern is 
continuing: most of the macro-economy’s growth is fueled by labor force growth. 
 
Table 2: Employment, Wages, Value Added, Value Added Per Worker, and Rough Estimate of Unit 
Labor Cost. All value data in current CFA.  Compound Average Annual Growth Rates 
EMPLOYMENT 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  CAAGR 
Agriculture         2,444,297     2,459,781     2,627,078     2,714,788     2,824,679  3.68% 
Industry            601,870        637,313        675,635        717,154        770,710  6.38% 
Services         2,178,418     2,254,525     2,407,793     2,496,090     2,673,677  5.25% 
C   ote d'Ivoire         5,224,585     5,351,619     5,710,506     5,928,032     6,269,066  4.66% 
 
WAGE BILL   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  CAAGR 
Agriculture 103,857  109,996  124,085 152,244  187,750 15.95% 
Industry 305,093  341,462  378,548 449,792  434,369 9.23% 
Services 962,337  1,060,918  995,422 961,063  1,080,615  2.94% 
C   ote d’Ivoire  1,371,287  1,512,376  1,498,055 1,563,099 1,702,734  5.56% 
 
VALUE  ADDED     1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 CAAGR 
Agriculture 1,527.8  1,595.5  1,798.9 1,768.1 1,906.7 5.70% 
Industry  1,268.0 1,618.1 1,649.3 1,742.3 1,640.8 6.66% 
Services  2,734.5 2,952.9 3,278.3 3,525.9 3,474.1 6.17% 
C   ote d'Ivoire  5,530.3  6,166.5  6,726.5 7,036.3 7,021.7 6.15% 
 
Value Added/Worker(000) 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  CAAGR 
Agriculture       625         649        685      651       675  1.94% 
Industry    2,107      2,539     2,441    2,430   2,129  0.26% 
Services    1,255      1,310     1,362    1,413   1,299  0.87% 
C   ote d'Ivoire    1,059      1,152     1,178    1,187   1,120  1.42% 
 
Unit Labor Cost  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  CAAGR 
Agriculture 0.067979  0.0689422 0.068979 0.0861045 0.098467 9.71% 
Industry 0.240619  0.2110264 0.229518 0.2581547 0.264722 2.42% 
Services 0.351922  0.3592833 0.303637 0.2725745 0.311051 -3.04% 
C   ote d'Ivoire  0.247961  0.2452585 0.222708 0.2221467 0.242497 -0.56% 
                                                 
18 This data was supplied by Richard Doffonsou of the World Bank field office in Abidjan. 
19 We are warned that data consistency problems make this estimate problematic. 
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7.   Concluding Remarks 
 
We have generated a twelve-partner index of the multilateral REER with dynamic 
weights that shift over time as trade partner patterns shift; the results indicate that 
Cote d’Ivoire’s competitiveness declined from 1996 to 2002, establishing a 
downward trend. The index appears to characterize the country’s non-competitiveness 
prior to 1994 and the impact of the devaluation. The set of indices based on the GDP 
deflator seems better than those based on CPIs on theoretical grounds, and shows the 
afore-mentioned competitiveness pattern rather clearly. The multilateral REER indices 
cover most of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade, always 60%, usually more than 70%, and as much as 
85% in early years. The bilateral REER with France moves somewhat differently from 
the multilateral REER against twelve major trade partners. Given the dramatic shift in the 
distribution of trade over the period, it seems clear that a multilateral REER index using 
fixed weights calculated on a single base year would not be adequate, as it would be very 
unrepresentative for most years. 
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s universe of trade partners has expanded over the last four decades. 
The commonly held perception that links with France dominate Cote d’Ivoire’s trade are 
no longer true, although the link with France remains an important trade link. The 
country has diversified sources of imports, and the customer base for exports. The 
country has moved from relying upon a single trade partner, to trade with much of the 
world.  
 
Cote d’Ivoire has not, however, diversified its mix of export products and this seems 
to be a source of its continued external vulnerability. It relies heavily upon cocoa bean 
exports, and also to a lesser extent upon coffee beans and cotton, that is, volatile 
agricultural commodities. All these three have volatile international prices which have 
declined steadily in real terms ever since 1976.  
 
We tested the hypothesis that world cocoa prices impact the competitiveness of Cote 
d’Ivoire via it’s real exchange rate and found evidence of “Dutch Disease”, i.e., that 
upturns in the real price of cocoa cause a change in the real exchange rate and make 
the country less competitive. Even though it has a nominal fixed exchange rate regime, 
the Cote d’Ivoire CFA franc’s strong link to the key commodity price indicate its 
characteristics of a “commodity currency” or, more specifically, a cocoa currency, 
heavily impacted by world commodity prices. We also found evidence that the 
devaluation of 1994 improved the country’s competitive position, shifting the schedule of 
the real exchange rate with respect to cocoa prices.  
 
We also complemented the analysis by a very preliminary look at recent data on 
wages, employment, and value added by sector, looking for indications of trends in 
competitiveness.  This indicates that slow growth is continuing, slower than that of 
inflation combined with labor force growth while wages grew very slightly less than 
value added. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Further Comparative Data on Real Exchange Rate Indices 
 
To facilitate comparison of REER indices built with CPIs versus GDP deflators, we 
provide Figure 11 and Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 10 Comparison of BREER Indices 

















































Bi RER-GDP Defl - France
Bi-RER-PPP w/France
 
Figure 11: :Comparison of MREER Indices. 






















































































































Multi RER-GDP Defl - 12 Countries
 
 
The BREER-MREER deviation is similar for both measures. Do the two sets of 
indices differ in terms of the deviations between bilateral versus multilateral measures of 
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the REER? The answer seems to be “no”. Figure 13 plots the percentage differences
20 of 
the BREER and MREER for the two sets of indices, one CPI based and the other GDP-
deflator based.  The two deviation measures track closely.  During the period between 
1980 and 1990, when the CFA was thought to be over-valued, the both MREER 
measures rose well above their corresponding BREER measures.  They closed at the time 
of devaluation, by construction.  Since devaluation, MREER indices have once again 
moved to their historic position above BREERs.
21 
 
Figure 12: The Differences Between Multilateral Versus Bilateral Measures of the Real Exchange 
Rate (CPI versus GDP Deflator) 
Comparison of Multi Vs Bilateral RER Deviations
Multilateral (12 Country) Real Exchange Rate Index









































































































                                                 
20 Based upon the difference of natural logarithms of the BREER minus the MREER. 
21 Comparative figures showing the two BREERs and two MREERs arefound in the Annex.  They track 
closely. 
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Further Data of Trade Partners in 1960 and 2000 
 
Figure 13: Export Destinations in 1960 









































Figure 14: Import Origins in 1960 
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Figure 15: Export Destinations in 2000 








































Figure 16: Import Origins in 2000 
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Productivity by Sectors 
Figure 17: Percent Value Added by Sector 
Percent of GDP Valuue Added 



























































































































Figure 18: Distribution of Value Added by Sector 
 
Distribution of GDP Value Added 
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